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In various papers, Colin Klein has argued that pain experiences are 
commands.  This monograph goes well beyond the papers, re-shaping 
Klein’s ‘imperativist’ view, setting it within a general account of 
‘homeostatic sensations’, presenting new arguments, and criticising 
alternatives.  Original, empirically informed, clear, and often persuasive, it 
is a lovely book.  
Suppose a sprain leaves you with a pain in your ankle.  For many 
theorists, this consists in your having an experience that represents, truly 
or falsely, that something is the case, e.g. that your ankle is damaged.  For 
his part, Klein agrees that your pain is intentional, but not that it is truth-
apt.  For he thinks your pain is a command—addressed to you by your 
body—to protect your ankle, specifically to keep it from bearing weight 
[ch. 5].  Moreover, your pain’s being a command turns not on the 
involvement of a special attitude, but on the pain’s content itself having an 
imperative rather than indicative mood (see chs. 5 and 8; also Martínez 
[2011]).  And it is in terms of such content, he thinks, that pain’s  
phenomenology and motivationality should be explained [chs. 1 and 6]. 
This is an account not of pain’s unpleasantness, notice, but of pain per se.  
(Contemporary theorists distinguish the two, accepting that non-
unpleasant pains are not only possible, but actual. Klein, more clearly here 
than in earlier work, agrees.)  But, while pain per se is Klein’s focus, pain’s 
unpleasantness (or, as Klein also puts it, its painfulness, hurting, feeling 
bad, or causing suffering) is not entirely neglected.  In his final chapter, 
Klein suggests—tentatively—that it too should be understood in terms of 
commands:  your pain’s being painful consists in your commanding 
yourself not to have it [186-7].  So, overall, Klein tends towards a double 
imperativism:  both your pain and its unpleasantness consist in 
commands, the former issued by your body for you to protect a body part, 
the latter issued by you for you not to have the pain.  
Klein’s picture is original.  While many explain painfulness in 
terms of pain-directed states, they typically invoke not commands, but 
desires (for the pain to stop).  And those who explain it in terms of 
commands typically invoke commands to stop some bodily disturbance 
rather than the pain itself (Martínez [2011]).  Turning from painfulness to 
pain, moreover, two points are striking.  First, among the many who 
explain pain per se in terms of intentional content, Klein is alone (I take it) 
in denying that pains are truth-apt.  There are other imperativists, but they 
either invoke imperative content to explain pain’s unpleasantness, not  
pain per se, or take the contents of pains to be imperative-indicative 
compounds (Martínez [2011] and Hall [2008]).  Second, among the many 
who take unpleasant pains to be intrinsically motivational, Klein is alone 
(I take it) in claiming that what makes pains motivational is not just their 
unpleasantness, but their being pains.  Again, he thinks that even non-
unpleasant, neutral pains, thanks to their imperative contents, motivate.  
Mild pains that prompt postural adjustments are for him a case in point: 
often non-unpleasant, yet motivational even so. 
 Now, it is controversial whether contents have moods at all.  But 
even granting for argument’s sake that they do, and that pains have such 
contents, why think with Klein that their contents are imperative, and that 
they are not even in part truth-apt?  Klein’s argument centres on what he 
takes to be pain’s primary role [ch. 3].  This role can be puzzling, for pain 
isn’t as tightly correlated with damage as one might think:  pain often 
precedes, or outlasts, or occurs entirely without damage; and serious 
damage can occur long before or entirely without pain.  Yet pain is 
adaptive:  those incapable of pain die young.  What’s crucial, for Klein, is 
why they do so:  not because of ‘dramatic acute injuries’, but because of 
‘the combined weight of repeated, trivial, but unhealed’ damage and 
strains [29–30].  What they apparently lack is pain’s power to motivate 
behaviour that enables post-damage recuperation (e.g. staying off a 
broken angle).  This is what Klein takes to be pain’s role.  And he argues 
that what illuminates the capacity of pains to play it is their being 
commands—in particular, commands to protect body parts—not their 
being truth-apt, informational states.  For commands, he claims, tell us 
what to do and motivate us to do it, whereas informational states don’t.  
This is why it is better to command than to inform when moving furniture 
with someone (‘Drop your end!’) and why fire alarms are designed to 
motivate not to illuminate.  And it is why Klein thinks pains are 
commands, for what is needed in the circumstances for which we evolved 
the capacity to feel pain is motivation, not information [chs. 1-3].  
On Klein’s picture, pain is just one of many similarly understood 
‘homeostatic sensations’ [ch. 2]. Hunger, thirst, itch, and the felt urge to 
breathe or to urinate or even to smoke are all sensations that motivate 
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behaviour to ‘maintain a parameter within an acceptable range’ [14]. And 
they do so distinctively.  Unlike reflexes, they are flexible, allowing 
deliberation.  Unlike desires, their flexibility is limited to ‘when … and 
how (out of a relatively small range of actions)’ the ‘homeostatic demand 
is satisfied’, thus excluding ‘whether you act or what (in a broader sense) 
you do’ [17].  What explains this motivational profile, Klein argues, is that 
they too are commands—to eat, drink, scratch and so on [17–25].  
Now, three phenomena might seem beyond Klein’s reach.  First, pains 
don’t just move us but give us reasons to act.  Klein agrees but thinks he 
can accommodate this. Invoking Hobbes, Hart, and Raz, he argues that 
you stand to your body as a citizen stands to the state, in particular that 
you accept your body as a ‘practical authority’, hence treat its commands 
as themselves reasons to obey [72-81].  
A second threat comes from pain asymbolics, who—as a result of 
neural damage—claim to feel pain when given noxious stimuli, yet 
appear—and say they are—neither bothered nor motivated by it.  But 
Klein takes this case actually to vindicate his account [chs. 11–12].  For 
asymbolics are both pain- and more generally threat-indifferent.  They 
withdraw neither from stimuli that are actually causing pain nor from 
things merely jabbed towards them threateningly.  And the best unifying 
explanation of this, Klein argues, is that their brain damage has eliminated 
their capacity to care about their bodily integrity.  For, on the one hand, 
this produces a general threat-indifference; and on the other, it 
undermines their acceptance of their bodies’ authority, leaving them 
unmoved by their body’s pain-commands [143, 156].  So asymbolic pains 
are motivational, Klein insists, but—lacking care—asymbolics are not for 
being motivated [82, 154]. 
Finally, isn’t imperative content insufficient to capture pains’ 
varying intensities, felt locations, and their burning, aching, and stinging?  
No, Klein replies [chs. 7-8].  He explains intensity in terms of a command’s 
urgency, conceived as a feature of its content, in particular as a ranking 
within the sets of ‘satisfaction worlds’ on which imperative contents are 
modelled [chs. 5 and 8].  As for your pain’s being felt in your hand, this 
consists in its being your hand that you’re commanded to protect, which 
in turn depends on its being your hand to which your pain directs your 
attention and care [§7.2]. And the difference between that pain being 
sharp and a dull ache is the difference between it being a command to 
withdraw your hand quickly and a command to treat your hand gingerly. 
But worries remain.  Consider first Klein’s account of pain’s 
motivationality.  Suppose a pain motivates you to jump out of a scalding 
shower.  It is really plausible to think with Klein that this behaviour is 
aimed at recuperation rather than defence?  Moreover, is pain per se 
(contrast its unpleasantness) really motivational at all?  Again, do non-
unpleasant pains really motivate?  Klein cites mild pains and the pains of 
the lobotomised as cases in point.  But arguably mild pains are unpleasant, 
just mildly, and when the lobotomised talk of their chronic pains not 
bothering them, this seems to reflect the absence not of pain’s 
unpleasantness, but of anxiety, anger, and other emotions that such 
unpleasant pains typically evoke downstream.  (This distinction is 
sometimes lost in Klein’s discussion.)  As for pain’s reason-giving force, 
how informative is it to explain the difference between those who are and 
those who aren’t moved by their pains in terms of those who do and those 
who don’t accept their bodies’ authority?  Not very if acceptance simply 
means being disposed to obey your body’s commands. Yet if it means 
something more demanding, perhaps taking your body’s commands to be 
reasons, there is a risk the account will fail to make sense of the 
motivational power of infant or animal pain.  
Turning to pain’s unpleasantness, can Klein explain why 
asymbolics’ pains are not unpleasant?  For him, the question becomes: 
why don’t asymbolics self-address commands to stop their pains?  Klein 
seems tempted to reply that they don’t do so because their pains don’t 
motivate them.  For it is pain’s irksome motivationality that, he thinks, 
partly explains why normal subject issue anti-pain commands.  But only 
partly, notice.  Klein also thinks the propensity to self-address anti-pain 
commands is explained by natural selection and associations between 
pains and negative emotions [186-9].  So, again, why don’t asymbolics self-
address such commands?  Moreover, if pain’s intrusive motivationality is 
even part of what explains our issuing unpleasantness-constituting 
commands, shouldn’t all felt urges be unpleasant? Yet they aren’t.  
Arguably the urge to stop running when you see a cliff edge is affectively 
neutral, and some other urges are pleasurable.  (Klein’s final chapter 
would be clearer on these matters if it didn’t so tightly intertwine 
questions about what constitutes, explains, and is bad about pain’s 
unpleasantness.)  
Returning to pain’s felt location, if this is determined as the focus 
of a subject’s care, and if Klein is right that asymbolics don’t care, their 
pains should lack felt location, but there is no evidence of this.  And, since 
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hunger motivates us to eat, hence to attend to our mouths, mustn’t Klein 
say (falsely) that hunger is felt in the mouth? As for burning versus 
stinging pains, surely capturing such distinctions in terms of subtle 
differences among the actions that pains command requires pains to 
specify such actions in exceedingly fine-grained ways. But do they?  
Wouldn’t that preclude just the deliberation about how to obey them that 
Klein insists they allow?  And wouldn’t it limit their useful capacity to 
interact with exceedingly diverse instrumental beliefs to produce equally 
diverse behaviours?  
To be clear, these worries cast no doubt on the value of Klein’s 
book.  They rather reflect how rich and provocative it is. Monographs 
about pain are few and far between, and it is a delight that the first in such 
a long time should be so good.  It will influence the debate for years to 
come.  
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